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Recent Developments in State Income
Taxation of Unitary Business
By PRENTISS WILLSON, JR.
B.A., Occidental College, 1965; J.D., HarvardLaw School, 1968; Partner,
Morrison & Foerster,San Francisco.

I.

WORLDWIDE UNITARY COMBINATION UNDER SIEGE
Multinational taxpayers are challenging worldwide combinations in a series of cases. Two of these cases, one arising from
California (Container Corporation of America)* and one arising
from Illinois (Chicago Bridge & Iron), are presently before the
United States Supreme Court. Three cases involving foreign parent corporations which California has proposed combining with
the domestic (and foreign) subsidiaries are in lower federal courts
(ShellPetroleum,Alcan, and CapitolIndustries-EMI). Others are
in the California courts (Firestone,Anaconda).
These cases are likely to be significantly affected by two decisions (ASARCO and Woolworth, described infra) of the United
States Supreme Court last term. These cases held that nondomiciliary states could not tax as business income an apportioned
share of dividends received by a domestic company from its foreign subsidiaries because the payor subsidiary was not unitary
with the parent. Thus the test for worldwide combination and the
test for inclusion of dividends as business income appear to be
very similar under the Supreme Court's analysis.
In addition to the fundamental issue of whether the businesses are "unitary," taxpayers are challenging worldwide combination on several other broad constitutional grounds:
A. under the foreign commerce clause, because it results in
double taxation;
B.
*

under the foreign commerce clause, because it impairs the

The seven cases mentioned in this paragraph are fully cited and discussed infra.
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ability of the federal government to "speak with one voice"
in the area of foreign affairs; and
C. under the due process clause, because the formula inevitably
leads to distortion (on its face or as applied to a particular
taxpayer).
I.

BACKGROUND TO UNITARY ISSUE
A. Early Property and Capital Stock Tax Cases
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court considered a number of capital stock and property tax cases applying formulary apportionment to railroads, telegraph companies, and other businesses directly involved in
interstate commerce. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (189 1); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio Stale Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897);American Express Co. v. Indiana, 165
U.S. 255 (1897); Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Union Tank
Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919); Wallace v. Hines, 253
U.S. 66 (1920).
B. United States Supreme Court Cases
Beginning in the 1920's the Supreme Court considered a series of corporate income tax cases applying formulary apportionment. UntilASA.RCO and Woolworth,* all demonstrated a close
economic relationship between operations in various states including a flow of products. See Exxon Corp. v. Department of
Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980); Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 315
U.S. 501 (1942); HansRees Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,283 U.S.
123 (1931); Bass, Ratclff & Gretton, Ltd v. State Tax Commissioner, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
C. State Courts Reach Different Results
Compare Edison CaliforniaStores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.
2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947) (business unitary if operations within
*

Fully cited infra.
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state dependent upon or contribute to the operations outside the
state), Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Department of Revenue, 1981
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1451, 422 N.E. 1350 (1981); and Ward PaperBox
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 638 P.2d 1053 (1981), vacatedand
remanded sub nom. Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v.Department of
Revenue, 103 S. Ct. 26 (1982) (the latter two cases involve diverse
lines of business with no product flow and only nominal centralized management and services - held unitary) with Commonwealth v. ACF Industries, Inc., 441 Pa. 129, 271 A.2d 273 (1970)
andAshgrove Cement Co., 7 Or. T.R. 6 (1977).
Consider also two cases in which the California Supreme
Court rejected the argument (ironically by the Franchise Tax
Board) that a flow of goods was required in order to be unitary.
Superior Oil Co. v. FranchiseTax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406, 34 Cal.
Rptr. 545, 386 P.2d 33 (1963) and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552, 386 P.2d 40 (1963).
D.

Application of Unitary Principles to Conglomerates

Regulation 25120 of the California Administrative Code
(CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, R.25120 (1973)) provides that conglomerates are unitary if there exists "strong centralized management." CompareAppeal of DanielIndustries, [4 Cal.] St. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 206-393 (State Board of Equalization 1980) (business involving manufacture and sale of sophisticated devices to meter
and control flow of liquid and gas not unitary with business of
manufacture and sale of alloy steel bolts and rivets), Appeal of
Holywood Film Enterprises, [4 Cal.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 206834 (State Board of Equalization 1982); with RJ Reynolds Tobacco Company v. Department of Revenue [Department of Revenue Decision No. 82-19 (Alaska, April 30, 1982)] (concluding
tobacco company not unitary with shipping company).
E.

Recent United States Supreme Court decisions
1. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425
(1980) (nondomiciliary state could include dividends
from foreign subsidiaries in apportionable business income based on assumption of Court that businesses were
unitary). States which rejoiced at this decision failed to
heed Court's warning that if "the business activities of the
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dividend payor have nothing to do with the activities of
the recipient in the taxing State, due process considerations might well preclude apportionability, because there
would be no underlying unitary business." Id at 442.
2. Exxon Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207

(1980) (domestic business found to be single unitary business, not the three separate businesses ((1) exploration
and production, (2) refining, and (3) marketing) for
which Exxon had argued).
III.

THE SUPREME COURT NARROWS THE DEFINITION
OF UNITARY
A. ASARCO Inc. v.Idaho State Tax Commission, 102 S. Ct.

3103 (1982), rev'g 99 Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 39 (1979).
Background
1. General
ASARCO was engaged in the business of mining, smelting, refining, and selling metals. Its commercial domicile
was in New York and it conducted business in numerous
states including Idaho, where its principal business was mining silver. Its smelting, refining, and other activities were
conducted outside of Idaho. During 1968-70, ASARCO received sizeable dividends from General Cable, Revere Copper & Brass, M.I.M. Holdings, ASARCO Mexicana, and
Southern Peru Copper. ASARCO also received interest on
Revere's convertible debentures, on a note received in connection with a prior sale of Mexicana stock, and on a note
received in connection with the sale of General Cable stock.
In addition, it received capital gains on the sale of General
Cable stock as well as on the sale of its M.I.M. stock. The
issue was whether Idaho could tax a portion of the dividends,
interest, and capital gains as business income.
2. Subsidiaries paying dividends
a. General Cable and Revere were engaged in the metal
fabricating business which was a business not conducted by ASARCO. ASARCO owned approximately 35% of the stock of each of these corporations
but had no representatives on the boards of directors,
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no common directors, and no common officers. Indeed an antitrust decree prohibited ASARCO from
even voting its stock in these corporations. There
were substantial intercompany transfers at competitive prices.
b. M.I.M. was engaged in mining, milling, smelting, and
refining in Australia and England. ASARCO owned
approximately 53% of M.I.M.'s stock, with the balance of the stock widely held. ASARCO had no representatives on the board of directors, no common
directors, and no common officers. There were no
significant business transactions between the two
corporations.
c. ASARCO owned 49% of the stock of Mexicana. Mexican law prohibited ownership of any greater percentage. ASARCO did not control Mexicana or dictate its
policies. There were no common officers. Both were
in the same general line of business but only nominal
intercompany sales were made from Mexicana.
ASARCO also performed miscellaneous services for
Mexicana and was compensated on an arm's-length
basis.
d. ASARCO owned 51.5% of Southern Peru but pursuant to the terms of an agreement with the other shareholders of Southern Peru, ASARCO could not
exercise control of the corporation. Under this agreement, which was incorporated into Southern Peru's
bylaws, ASARCO could appoint only six of the thirteen directors. Approximately 35% of the copper produced by Southern Peru was sold to ASARCO, all at
arm's-length prices. ASARCO provided certain incidental technical services for which it received a fee.
3. Treatment of the income
ASARCO treated the dividend income from these subsidiaries as nonbusiness income not subject to apportionment
in Idaho. Idaho determined that these amounts were apportionable business income increasing taxable income from
$400,000 to $2,300,000 in one year and from $128,000 to
$2,200,000 in another. The initial decision of the Idaho
Supreme Court in favor of the state was in March 1979 (99
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Idaho 924, 592 P.2d 389). The United States Supreme Court
vacated that decision and remanded the case "for reconsideration in light of' Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,
445 U.S. 425 (1980), ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3108. On remand, the Idaho Supreme Court issued a one paragraphper
curiam decision, reinstating its prior opinion. 102 Idaho 38,
624 P.2d 946 (1981).
B. F W. Woolworth Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department,
102 S. Ct. 3128 (1982), revs' 95 N.M. 519, 624 P.2d 28 (1981).
1. Background
Woolworth and its foreign subsidiaries were engaged in
the same general line of business. The operations of the subsidiaries were highly decentralized. There was no flow of
goods. The management of the foreign subsidiaries had
complete control over business decisions.
2. Issue
The issue was the same as in ASARCO, namely can a
.state (New Mexico) constitutionally tax dividends from these
foreign subsidiaries as business income?
C. Holdings
The Supreme Court held Idaho and New Mexico could not
tax the dividends as business income.
1. The Court reiterated that the "linchpin of apportionability for state income taxation of an interstate enterprise is the unitary business principle." 102 S. Ct. at 3134
(quoting Exxon Corp. v. Department ofRevenue, 447 U.S.
207, 223 (1980) in turn quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980)).
2. In Mobil and Exxon "the states prevailed because it was
clear that the corporations operated unitary businesses
with a continuous flow and interchange of common products." ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3116, n.24. Exxon was a
domestic combination case where Exxon sought to separately account for its income in Wisconsin. The Court
found that Exxon constituted a simple unitary business
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because it was a "highly integrated business which benefits from an umbrella of centralized management and
controlled interaction." Exxon, 447 U.S. at 224.
3. By contrast, in ASARCO and Woolworth the Court
found on the facts that there was no functional integration and no substantial operational interdependence.
4. Several of the key observations of the Court should affect
the scope of the factual inquiry of state revenue agents:
a. "Except for the type of occasional oversight - with
respect to capital structure, major debt, and dividends
- that any parent gives to an investment in a subsidiary, there is little or no integration of the business activities or centralization of the management of [the
corporations involved]." Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at
3138.
b. The Court made clear that thepotential ability to operate a company as part of a unitary business is not
dispositive, but that the companies must be operated
as an integrated enterprise. Woolworth, 102 S. Ct. at
3135; ASARCO, 102 S. Ct. at 3114-15. This should
seriously undercut the heavy reliance California traditionally places on its administrative regulations
which set out an administrati'epresunptionof unitary
business in the event of either a vertical enterprise or
operations in the same line of business. Title 18, California Administrative Code, Register 25120. To the
extent such a presumption is based on the notion that
such enterprises have a highpotentialfor the requisite
integration, it is clear that actual substantial operational interdependence is necessary.
c. Observation: It is probable that the standards set out
by the Supreme Court will lead to a somewhat anomalous result in audits: audits regarding proposed combination of a parent and subsidiaries would seem to
need more focus on real operational ties, not the trivial connections on which California often constructs a
unitary case and which are so time consuming to answer the multitude of questions proposed. On the
other hand, the Multistate Tax Commission has suggested that in audits relating to taxation of dividends
as business or nonbusiness income, much greater in-
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formation will be necessary since a nondomiciliary
state can reach only dividends from a functionally integrated subsidiary.
IV.

CaterpillarTractor Co. P.Lenckos, 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417 N.E.2d 1343
(198 1),prob.juris notedsub. nom. ChicagoBridge & Iron v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 102 S. Ct. 564 (1982), oral argument April 19,
1982, reargument ordered May 3, 1982, 102 S. Ct. 2032 (1982).
A. Background
1. Case arose when Caterpillar filed claims for refund of approximately $8 million for 1969-1974. No dispute exists
but that the Caterpillar parent and approximately
twenty-one subsidiaries are operating a single unitary
business.
2. Despite a prior ruling that combined reporting was not
authorized (Illinois Income Tax Information Bulletin
[1975-1 Ill.] ST. TAX REP. (CCH) 11,541), the Illinois
Department of Revenue agreed with Caterpillar that a
single unitary business was being conducted. Caterpillar
sought judicial review of a decision that it was unitary for
1969 and the denial of certain deductions.
3. Meanwhile, Chicago Bridge & Iron (CBI) filed its tax returns using the separate, arm's-length method and Illinois
asserted that worldwide combination was necessary.
4. CBI and numerous corporations then intervened in the
Caterpillar litigation.
B. Present status
1. In the Illinois Supreme Court, Caterpillar and the Illinois
Department of Revenue prevailed. 84 Ill. 2d 102, 417
N.E.2d 1343 (1981).
2. On April 19, 1982, the case was argued to the Supreme
Court (Justice Stevens was not present); on May 3, 1982,
the case was reset for oral argument next term (no date
was ordered). 102 S. Ct. 2032. In 1983 the Supreme
Court dismissed the case for want of a substantial federal
question. 103 U.S. 3563.
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V. ContainerCorp. ofAmerica v. FranchiseTax Board, 117 Cal. App.
3d 988, 173 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1981),prob.juris.noted 102 S. Ct. 2034
(1982) (oral argument heard January 10, 1983).
A. Background of the case
1. Action for refund of California franchise taxes brought
by Container Corporation of America (CCA) against the
Franchise Tax Board. The case involves two important
issues relating to the application of the California unitary
doctrine in state taxation of corporations:
a. Whether on the facts of the case the parent and subsidiaries are involved in a unitary business within the
California statutes and court decisions.
b. Whether the unitary doctrine may be applied on a
worldwide basis to a United States parent and its
subsidiaries.
2. On October 19, 1979, the California Superior Court entered judgment in favor of the Board. The decision was
affirmed by the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, April 14, 1981, 117 Cal. App. 3d 998, 173
Cal. Rptr. 121. The California Supreme Court declined
to review the case. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeal. 51 U.S.L.W.
4987 (U.S. June 27, 1983).
3. Our law firm, Morrison & Foerster, is counsel for CCA in
the litigation. Understandably, this presentation views
the case from CCA's position.
B. Facts of the case
1. The case involves the years 1963-65. CCA is headquartered in Chicago, Illinois, and owns a controlling interest
in twenty subsidiaries organized and operating in foreign
countries. CCA's operations are solely within the United
States and involve the manufacture and sale of boxes and
cartons. CCA makes a few sales outside the United
States but the subsidiaries are not involved. CCA's products include both plain brown boxes and specially
designed consumer-oriented cartons. The subsidiaries
are in the same general business as the parent.
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2. Operating subsidiaries are located in Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico, Germany, Holland, and Italy.
3. The subsidiaries in each country are self-sufficient. In
some countries the subsidiaries buy their own raw materials, manufacture pulp, produce the boxes and cartons,
and sell in the local countries. In other countries the subsidiaries do not manufacture pulp but buy the materials
for producing boxes and cartons from independent
sources. There is almost no transfer of raw materials or
finished products from the parent to the subsidiaries.
There are no transfers of raw material or finished products from the subsidiaries to the parent. There is little
transfer of technology or know-how from CCA to the
subsidiaries (the information is readily available otherwise) nor is there much help from CCA in marketing and
sales (because of differences in products and customer
needs). CCA provides management services at the policy
level in regard to approval of capital additions. The daily
operations of the subsidiaries are left to local management. There is little in the way of centralized services by
the parent. The parent provides about 40% of the financing for the subsidiaries; 60% is obtained in the local country. There is not much transfer of personnel from the
parent to the subsidiaries or vice versa. During the years
in suit twenty-six employees of the subsidiaries were formerly employees of CCA. There are a total of 6800 employees in the subsidiaries. Practically all of the top
officers of the subsidiaries were local, and in nearly half
of the subsidiaries a majority of the Board of Directors
was local. In a number of instances CCA acted as a broker in finding machinery (principally used machinery) for
the Latin American subsidiaries.
C. Summary of the arguments
1. CCA's position is that CCA and the foreign subsidiaries
are not unitary.
a. Basic California cases such as Butler Brothers v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), af'd,
315 U.S. 501 (1942); Edison California Stores, Inc. v.
McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947), in-
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volved a transfer of products. In fact, all of the reported decisions on the unitary doctrine through
Chase Brass & Copper Co. v. FranchiseTax Board, 7
Cal. App. 3d 99, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350, modfled, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 496, 87 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1970), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 400 U.S. 961 (1971), have involved a fact situation in which there is a substantial
flow of products, either from a manufacturing parent
to a sales subsidiary or division, or from a central
purchasing division to a sales subsidiary or division.
The only exceptions are the Court of Appeal decision
in this case and the California Supreme Court decisions in Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board,
60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40, 34 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963),
and Superior Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 60
Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963). In
the latter two cases, the Supreme Court was struck by
the unfair result of separate accounting. These cases
involved producing oil companies with very extensive
central operations, management, and services flowing
into all states in which the companies had operations.
If the separate businesses are in fact closely integrated, then combined reporting and apportionment
by formula is reasonable within the domestic United
States. The decisions do not, however, support a
holding that CCA and its subsidiaries are unitary.
b. ASARCO and Woolworth strongly support CCA's
position that the requisite operational and functional
interdependence are not present.
2. Combined reporting impairs federal uniformity in an
area where federal uniformity is essential.
a. Worldwide combined reporting prevents the Federal
Government from "speaking with one voice" when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments; as a result it violates the foreign commerce
clause. In Japan Line, Ltd v. County ofLos Angeles,
441 U.S. 434, 448-49 (1979) the Court said the following: "[A] state tax on the instrumentalities of foreign
commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential. Foreign commerce is preeminently a matter of national concern."
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b.

c.

d.

e.

Id at 448. The Court spoke of the Framers' overriding concern that "the Federal Government must
speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign governments." Id at 449.
Disputes may arise in attempts to reconcile the competing claims of various jurisdictions to impose taxes
which only the Federal Government has the authority
to resolve with respect to foreign nations.
If a state tax creates an asymmetry in the international
tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by a state
tax levy may retaliate against American-owned instrumentalities in their jurisdictions.
The Federal Government has spoken. All United
States tax treaties (except with the Soviet Union), the
United States "model" Income Tax Treaty, and numerous others adopt the arm's-length method as between corporations operating in the United States and
related entities operating in foreign countries.
The states' response to the "one-voice" argument has
been that there is no uniform federal policy created by
Congress which precludes use of formula apportionment of unitary business income for state income taxation as is demonstrated by the rejection in Congress
of Article IX(4) of the proposed United States-United
Kingdom tax treaty. 2 TAX TREATIES (CCH) 8103
I (Mar. 25, 1980) and by the rejection in Congress
year after year of bills introduced which would, if
passed, restrict the ability of states to require worldwide combination.

3. Worldwide combined reporting creates a substantial risk
of multiple taxation.
a. The international situation differs from that presented
in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267
(1978), where the Court upheld an Iowa single factor
formula. The Court expressed a clear tolerance of the
imperfections in varying apportionment methods
when commerce within the United States is involved.
b. In Japan Lines, the Court indicated: "When a State
seeks to tax the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations

. . .

come into

play. The first is the enhanced risk of multiple taxa-

1983]

Unitary Business Taxation

tion. . the basis for this Court's approval of apportioned property taxation. . . has been its ability to
enforce full apportionment by all potential taxing
bodies." 441 U.S. at 446-47. "Yet neither this Court
nor this Nation can ensure full apportionment when
one of the taxing entities is a foreign sovereign." Id
at 447.
c. The parties dispute whether or not double taxation actually results or is impermissible if it does.
1) Former Secretary of the Treasury William Simon
commented as follows:
The unitary system contains the implicit assumption that profit rates in different units of
a corporate family, engaged in different activities or in different locations are always the
same. This is clearly not the case. Thus, to
the extent profit rates differ, the unitary system misallocates income. Whenever profit
rates are higher in foreign affiliates than in
domestic activities, the unitary system does
have the effect of taxing foreign corporations.
2) Former Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal
summarized the same concerns in a letter to the
California Franchise Tax Board:
Though you state that unitary apportionment
is 'the most accurate and reasonable method
yet devised' for assessing the income of one
element in a multi-national group, it is our
experience, as well as that of most other
countries, that the determination of income
on the basis of an arm's-length standard is
not only more accurate but also far less arbitrary. The arm's-length standard is the internationally accepted approach. Thus, in an
international context, the use of another
method by one jurisdiction will often lead to
double taxation.
Letter from W. Michael Blumenthal to Martin
Huff, Executive Officer of the Franchise Tax
Board (Feb. 15, 1977) (reprinted in Appendix to
Brief for the International Bankers Association in
California, Akai Electric Co., Ltd., as ,4mici Cu-
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riae in support of Appellant. Chicago Bridge d
Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., No. 81-349,
Jan. 8, 1982.).
3) Treasury Tax Reform Option Paper No. VIII,
dealing with international taxation, discussed a
proposal to require states to use arm's-length reporting rather than worldwide combined reporting and set forth the following reasons, among
others, for and against this proposal:
Pro. The arm's-length standard under which
corporations apply to interfirm transactions,
those prices which would have been used by
an independent buyer and seller, has become
the international method of allocating income
between countries. When one country or the
states within that country apply an unconventional rule, international double taxation of
income results. As state income tax rates
have increased, this double taxation has become more onerous.
Con. State tax administrators believe that the
unitary method yields higher state tax revenues (this advantage being the other side of
the double taxation coin), and as a result vigorously oppose federal restrictions on their

practices.
d. The California position, as stated in its amicus brief
in the Chicago Bridge& Iron case, disputes the double
taxation argument:
1) Multiple taxation by different governmental levels
is permitted since the identical income may be,
and normally is, taxed at least twice, once by the
United States and once by Illinois. The State,
then, asserts that "no authority or reasoning suggests that the rules should differ just because the
national level tax is imposed by some other country." Brief of Amicus Curiae for Appellee at 18,
Chicago Bride & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 102 S. Ct. 2032 (1982).
2) California also argues that all double taxation is
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eliminated by the federal tax credit provisions.
Id at 17.
3) California also cited a Harvard Law Review
Note, MultinationalCorporationsandIncome 41location Under Section 482 of the InternalRevenue
Code, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1202 (1976) in asserting
that unitary apportionment is allowed by the IRS
in actual application of I.R.C. § 482 and the regulations under section 863, all in an effort to show
that worldwide combined reporting is not in conffict with federal policy. Id at 33-34.
4. Extending the unitary doctrine to include corporations
operating in foreign countries raises serious problems of
distortion and administration.
a. Extending the unitary doctrine to include foreign corporations causes serious problems of distortion and
administration to arise that are not present when it is
limited to domestic corporations.
b. In regard to distortion, the unitary system assumes
that all units of the combined group are operating in a
common market with a common economic and political system. The underlying assumption is that a dollar of property, payroll, and sales will earn about the
same amount of net income anywhere within the geographic area to which the system applies. This is basically true within the United States; it is not true on a
worldwide basis for the following reasons:
1) As a general matter, foreign subsidiaries of
United States corporations are more profitable
than the parent. The unitary doctrine will inevitably attribute some part of the net income of the
subsidiaries to the United States. The expert testimony in the CCA case showed:
i) Multinational companies utilize different
"hurdle rates" in different parts of the world
which set a minimum anticipated rate of return. If it is not met, the investment will not
be made.
ii) These hurdle rates vary from company to
company, industry to industry, and country
to country. An individual United States
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company will invariably have a higher hurdle
rate for a foreign investment than for a similar domestic investment, however. Thus,
United States companies expect to receive a
greater rate of return on a foreign investment
than on a similar domestic investment. Furthermore, United States companies have a
single hurdle rate for similar United States
investments.
iii) The expectation of a greater rate of return on
foreign investments is actually achieved.
iv) These greater profits are achieved for several
reasons including lower labor costs, more
rapidly expanding economies, greater market
share, governmental protection from competition, and so forth.
2) The evidence demonstrates that CCA's foreign
subsidiaries in Latin America and Holland were
more profitable than its United States operations.
The following table compares the income attributable to the various countries under a separate accounting analysis with that assigned to the
countries under California's unitary system.
Average Pre-Tax Income
per Separate Accounting
in Different Countries*
1963/64/65

CCA
Colombia
Mexico
Venezuela
Panama
Austria
Germany
Holland
Italy
Total Overseas
Total Combined
*000's omitted

$28,121
4,254
1,605

4,246
1,286
(13)
1,793
384
34
13,588
$41,170

Average Pre-Tax Income
per Apportionment*
1963/64/65

$32,068
2,203
1,430
1,907
11
2,906
197
988
9,642
$41,710

Unitary Business Taxation
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The above data demonstrate that the distortion produced by the formula is particularly acute as between
the underdeveloped and the highly industrialized
countries. (Note that the apportionment formula attributes approximately one-half of the income produced in Colombia and Venezuela according to
separate accounting principles to other countries.) In
Colombia's case, less income is apportioned to Colombia than the Colombian subsidiaries paid in taxes.
The United States, on the other hand, is the principal
beneficiary of this reassignment of income.
3) The evidence also demonstrates substantial differences in the factors as between CCA and the foreign subsidiaries and their relationship to net
income, particularly in regard to payroll. The
data are summarized in the following tables
which compare the relationship between dollars
of sales, of payroll, and of property required to
produce $1.00 of net income computed for CCA
domestically and for CCA's foreign subsidiaries
as a whole.
Amount Required to Produce $1.00 of Net
Income for the Years in Issue
Payroll
$3.17

Sales
$9.82

Property
$4.15

Foreign:

1.19

7.73

5.45

Domestic:

2.92

9.27

4.15

Foreign:

1.02

6.88

4.50

Domestic

2.99

9.88

4.85

Foreign

0.97

6.52

4.18

Domestic:
1963

1964

1965

As can be seen from this table, the distortion in
the apportionment of CCA's income can be traced
primarily to a dramatic difference in the relationship of payroll cost to net income in the United
States as compared to other countries, and to a
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lesser extent to a difference in the relationship of
sales to net income.
The lower cost of labor in foreign countries where
CCA maintains subsidiaries is not offset by differences in productivity. The following table shows
the direct labor cost for workers in plants that
convert paperboard into corrugated shipping containers in Colombia and California. These figures
indicate the average wage of workers in a corrugated plant in Colombia and California and the
number of work-hours necessary to produce one
thousand square feet (MSF) of corrugated containers in each of the plants. The table also indicates the labor cost per MSF for each plant.
Analysis of Hourly Labor Costs*
for Corrugated Plants
Corona,
CA

Oakland, Fresno, Malt. Ave,
CA
CA
CA

California
Weighted
Average

Colombia

Workhours per MSF
Labor Cost per workhour

6.48

.39
7.83

6.71

7.90

7.41

1,21

Labor Cost per MSF

2.64

3.09

2.20

2.64

2.85

1.19

.41

.33

.33

.J9

.98

4) Exchange rate fluctuations also may cause distortions. Depending upon the relationship of foreign
currency to the dollar in any particular year, a
foreign subsidiary may have a profit or loss based
solely on currency fluctuations. Serious problems
may also arise in regard to determining the value
of current assets as well as other problems.
5) The Franchise Tax Board has protested that a
taxpayer cannot contest the use of the unitary approach by using separate accounting data. Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267

(1978), affirms the use of separate accounting
analysis. See supra section I.C.3.
c. Extending the unitary doctrine to foreign corporations
also raises serious administrative problems for taxpayers and the Board. Thus, foreign corporations are or
should be required to restate their net incomes in accordance with the California franchise tax law. Fur-
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ther, serious questions arise in regard to the ability of
the Board to audit combined reports which include
foreign corporations.
d. CCA's position is that the unitary doctrine cannot be
applied on a worldwide basis because of the distortions inherent in such application. California court
decisions upholding the unitary doctrine have all
been based upon the application of the doctrine to the
common market established within the domestic
United States. The decisions have not dealt with the
different conditions which obtain as between the
United States and other countries of the world, particularly the so-called underdeveloped countries. This
leads to inevitable distortions. These differences in
economic conditions are more or less permanent in
nature, or will at least run for a long time. Thus, conditions as between the United States and foreign
countries must be distinguished from differences in
economic conditions within the United States where,
for example, lower wages in one area will induce
business to move to that area causing such wages to
rise over a period of time. The same freedom of
movement is not present in the international sphere.
Thus, such cases as John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise
Tax Board,38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1961) which
upheld the unitary doctrine in spite of differences in
economic return within the United States are
distinguishable.
It should be noted that in Chase Brass, the court upheld the.exclusion from the unitary group of a subsidiary operating in Chile but did not provide its
reasoning on the matter. However, in Anaconda v.
FranchiseTax Board, 130 Cal. App. 3d 15, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 640 (1982), discussed infra, the Court of Appeal
upheld the inclusion of a Chilean mining subsidiary.
VI. OTHER PENDING CASES
A. Shell Petroleum N. V
Aug. 4, 1982).

P.

Grapes, No. C81 4302 (N.D. Cal.
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1. Background and Facts
Shell Petroleum N.V. (SPNV), a company based in the
Netherlands, has brought suit in Federal District Court to
restrain the California Franchise Tax Board from issuing
franchise tax assessments against two domestic companies,
Shell Oil Company and Scallop Nuclear. The FTB has proposed assessments against Shell which treat the company as
part of a worldwide unitary business. It has also indicated
that the tax assessments may be issued against Scallop on the
same basis. SPNV contends that such assessments would violate treaty provisions between the United States and the
Netherlands (especially the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce
and Navigation, Mar. 27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8
U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 4024) and the United States
Constitution.
2. Decision
On August 4, 1982, the District Court decided against
Shell, concluding that SPNV, as a mere shareholder of Shell
Oil Company and Scallop Nuclear, lacked "standing to sue."
As an independent ground for deciding against SPNV, the
court concluded that the time was not "ripe" for such a lawsuit because contingent events might intervene which would
eliminate the anticipated problem since there are no Notices
of Proposed Assessment as yet issued against Shell or Scallop
Nuclear and no final administrative action has been taken.
The court continued as follows:
During the hearing and appeal process, the Franchise
Tax Board and Board of Equalization would presumably
be applying the Bank and Corporation Tax Law with the
decisions of the Supreme Court in Asarco Inc. v. Idaho
State Tax Commission, 50 U.S.L.W. 4962 (U.S. June 29,
1982) [102 S. Ct. 3103] and F.. Woolworth Co. v Taxation and Revenue Department, 50 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S.
June 29, 1982) [102 S. Ct. 3218] in mind. These cases,
decided while these motions were under submission, reversed state supreme court decisions that had upheld taxation of formula-apportioned income received from
foreign subsidiaries of the taxpayers. They clarify the
definition of 'unitary business' which can pass muster
under the due process clause. Just how the Board will
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apply the Bank and Corporation Tax Law now remains
to be seen.

Memorandum Decision and Order, Shell Petroleum, at 13.
The Court of Appeal for the 9th Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. Shell Petroleum, N.V. . Franchise
Tax Board, 709 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1983).
B.

Capitol Industries-EMI,Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1982).
EMI, a United Kingdom corporation which is the parent of
Capitol Industries, brought suit for injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the FTB from assessing additional income against Capitol Industries, which operates in California
on a worldwide combination basis, including the income and
factors of EMI. The Ninth Circuit held on February 16,
1982, that EMI did not have an adequate state remedy and
thus the Federal District Court had jurisdiction over the EMI
claims. The case was remanded back to the Federal District
Court. However, the Ninth Circuit did not decide the standing issue discussed above but expressed serious reservations
about the parent's standing to sue. On remand the District
Court decided against EMI on the standing issue and EMI
has appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In the companion case
involving EMI's subsidiary, Capitol Industries, the Court
held that Capitol could not sue in the Federal District Court
because California tax procedures provided for a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy for a taxpayer doing business
there. Capitol's petition for certiorari has been denied. 103
S. Ct. 570 (1982).
C. Alcan Aluminium Ltd v. Franchise Tax Board, No. 81 Civ
3911 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 1982).
This case is another foreign parent, worldwide unitary case
brought in federal court. The court concluded that the AntiInjunction Act did not bar the taxpayer's suit because it did
not have a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" in the California courts. The court also held the eleventh amendment
to the United States Constitution (which protects states from
being sued in federal court without their consent) did not bar
the suit because the eleventh amendment does not apply to
federal court actions against state officials to enjoin them
from enforcing unconstitutional statutes. However, the court
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stayed the action pending a disposition of the issues concerning the FTB's worldwide unitary approach in state court or
in the United States Supreme Court (citing the Container
case).
D. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Franchise Tax Board.
1. Background
The FTB combined Firestone on a worldwide basis for
the years 1960 through 1963. The trial court determined that
thirteen of Firestone's foreign manufacturing subsidiaries
were not engaged in a unitary business with Firestone. The
trial court determined that nine remaining foreign subsidiaries were unitary with Firestone and that there were no constitutional impediments to worldwide combined reporting
and that generally no adjustments to the factors were
required.
Firestone appealed from those portions of the judgment
determining that the nine foreign companies were engaged
in a unitary business with Firestone, that worldwide combined reporting is constitutionally permissible, and that
worldwide formulary apportionment as applied to the facts
of this case properly reflects California's taxable income.
The FTB cross-appealed from that portion of the judgment
which determined that thirteen of the foreign companies
were not engaged in a unitary business with Firestone.
2. Statement of Facts
Firestone was engaged in the manufacture, distribution,
and sale throughout the United States of tires, tubes, and related products. Firestone concedes that an apportionable
part of that income from those operations is properly subject
to tax by California.
Firestone also owned a majority of the equity common
stock of various domestic (incorporated in the United States
but not in California) and foreign (incorporated outside the
United States) corporations.
3. Status of the Case
The case is presently in the California Court of Appeal,
Second Appellate District, Division Four, 2nd Civil No.
62918.
E. Anaconda Co. v. FranchiseTax Board, 130 Cal. App. 3d 15,
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181 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982), appeal docketed (U.S. Aug. 20,
1982).
1. Background
The issue was similar to one raised in the Chase Brass
case, specifically, whether Anaconda was engaged in a unitary business with its Chilean and Mexican subsidiaries. The
trial court found for Anaconda resulting in a refund in excess
of $3 million for income years 1956-1958. The Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division Four), issued its second opinion on March 24, 1982, reversing the trial court.
The court held that the FTB had properly treated the corporation as engaged in a unitary business with its foreign
subsidiaries.
Anaconda, as the nation's second largest copper producer, was principally engaged in producing copper within
the continental United States. It owned and operated two
major copper mines in the United States.
Anaconda had three affiliates doing business in Chile
and engaged in mining and processing copper and metal byproducts. During the years involved there was very substantial intervention in the basic operations of the Chilean subsidiaries by the government of Chile.
2. Decision of Court of Appeal
Anaconda challenged unity of ownership on the ground
that the pervasive intervention in the subsidiary's operations
undermined the parent corporation's nominal ownership and
control. The court acknowledged the government regulation
and intervention but held that it did not upset the unity of
ownership.
With regard to unity of operation, the court relied on
intercompany copper sales between the Chilean companies
and Anaconda's domestic unitary operation as well as some
assistance in purchasing rendered by the parent plus "periodic internal audits of Latin American company records [by
the parent]" and the providing by the parent of "statistical
material" for the Latin American companies. 130 Cal. App.
3d at 26. The court also relied on substantial intercompany
loans and the guaranty of a number of loans obtained by the
foreign subsidiaries. In addition, the court looked to certain
high level hiring decisions which had to be approved by Ana-

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol, 6

conda's executive committee, some limited transfers of employees to the foreign subsidiaries who were allowed to
continue their domestic employee benefits, and certain employees' participation in a stock option plan of the parent, as
well as the providing of certain administrative services. All
of these the court found to be "overwhelming" indications of
unity of operation. Id
The unity of use the court found as a result of the overlap of the Board of Directors was that many Anaconda officers were key officers of the foreign subsidiaries, that the
Board of Directors of the parent was "advised of Latin
American operating conditions," and the submitting of
financial reports from the subsidiary to the parent corporation- Id at 27.
The court found itself needing to distinguish Chase
Brass where the Court of Appeal excluded from the unitary
group Braden Copper Corporation (a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation) which along with two of Anaconda's subsidiaries doing business in Chile were the three
largest Chilean producers of copper. The court distinguished
the two by finding that, in the Chase Brass case, Braden was
a copper producer and Chase was a manufacturer. The court
then quoted the ChaseBrass court to the effect that functions
of a vertically integrated enterprise are not so markedly unitary as they are in a horizontally integrated business. Thus,
the court said that since Braden and Chase were involved in
different aspects of the copper business they would be considered vertically integrated and thus less likely to be unitary.
That was distinguishable, the court thought, because Anaconda and the Latin American subsidiaries were involved in
the mining aspect of the copper business. It also found additional ties between Anaconda and its Chilean operations over
and above those which existed between Chase and Braden
including, extensive operational ties in areas such as purchasing, personnel, accounting, loans, and engineering services as
well as the integration of major executive functions "such as
overlap on the Boards of Directors and in the key officer positions of the companies." Id at 29.

